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Introduction
My name is Michael Greenberger.
I want to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify on the important issue that is the
subject of today’s hearings.
After 25 years in private legal practice, I served as the Director of the Division of Trading
and Markets (“T&M”) at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) from
September 1997 to September 1999. In that capacity, I supervised approximately 135 CFTC
personnel in CFTC offices in DC, New York, Chicago, and Minneapolis, including lawyers and
accountants who were engaged in overseeing the Nation’s futures exchanges. During my tenure
at the CFTC, I worked extensively on, inter alia, regulatory issues concerning exchange traded
energy derivatives, the legal status of over-the-counter (“OTC”) energy derivatives, and the
CFTC authorization of trading of foreign exchange derivative products on computer terminals in
the United States.
While at the CFTC, I also served on the Steering Committee of the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”). In that capacity, I drafted, or oversaw the drafting of,
portions of the April 1999 PWG Report entitled “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of
Long-Term Capital Management,” which recommended to Congress regulatory actions to be
taken in the wake of the near collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge
fund, including Appendix C to that report which outlined the CFTC’s role in responding to that
near collapse. As a member of the International Organization of Securities Commissions’
(“IOSCO”) Hedge Fund Task Force, I also participated in the drafting of the November 1999
report of IOSCO’s Technical Committee relating to the LTCM episode: “Hedge Funds and Other
Highly Leveraged Institutions.”
After a two year stint between 1999 and 2001 as the Principal Deputy Associate Attorney
General in the U.S. Department of Justice, I began service as a Professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law. At the law school, I have, inter alia, focused my attention on futures
and OTC derivatives trading, including academic writing and speaking on these subjects. I
currently teach a course that I designed entitled “Futures, Options, and Derivatives.”
The question whether there has been excessive speculation of U.S. energy futures markets in
general, and futures based on U.S. delivered crude oil contracts specifically, has been the subject
of many hearings. I have previously testified at six of those hearings, the most recent held on
June 24, 2008 before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Government
Affairs. To put the issue of this Committee’s hearings in context, I summarize and update the
points I made at that hearing immediately below.
Summary and Update of Prior Testimony
One of the fundamental purposes of futures contracts is to provide price discovery in the “cash”
or “spot” markets.1 Those selling or buying commodities in the “spot” markets rely on futures prices
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to judge amounts to charge or pay for the delivery of a commodity.2 Since their creation in the
agricultural context decades ago, it has been widely understood that, unless properly regulated,
futures markets are easily subject to distorting the economic fundamentals of price discovery (i.e.,
cause the paying of unnecessarily higher or lower prices) through excessive speculation, fraud, or
manipulation.3
As the 1935 Report of this Committee stated: “The fundamental purpose of the measure [i.e.,
what was to become the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”)] is to insure fair practice and
honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over those forms of
speculative activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers and consumers
and the exchanges themselves.”4
Indeed, President Roosevelt, when introducing what became the CEA said: “[I]t should be our
national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative
operations.”5 In this regard, this Committee then stated: “This bill authorizes the Commission . . . to
fix limitations upon purely speculative trades . . .”6
The CEA has long been judged to effectively prevent excessive speculation and manipulation.
Accordingly, prior to the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”),
“all futures activity [was] confined by law (and eventually to criminal activity) to [CFTC regulated]
exchanges alone.”7 At the behest of Enron, the CFMA authorized the “stunning”8 change to the
CEA to allow the option of trading energy commodities on deregulated trading platforms, i.e.,
exchanges exempt from CFTC contract market registration requirements, thereby rejecting the
contrary 1999 advice of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which included the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and the Chairmen of the SEC
and CFTC. 9 This exemption from contract market regulation is called the “Enron Loophole.”
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Two prominent and detailed bipartisan studies by the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations’ (“PSI”)10 staff concluded that large financial institutions and wealthy investors
had needlessly driven up the price of energy commodities over what economic fundamentals
dictate, adding, for example, what the PSI estimated to be @ $20-$25 per barrel to the price of a
barrel of crude oil.11 At the time of that estimate, the price of crude oil had reached a then record
high of $77. The conclusion that excessive speculation has added a considerable premium to
energy products has been corroborated by many experts on12, and observers of, these markets.13
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The PSI staff and others have identified the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) of Atlanta,
Georgia, as an unregulated trading facility upon which a considerable amount of exempt U.S. energy
futures trading is done.14 For purposes of facilitating exempt natural gas futures, ICE is deemed a
U.S. “exempt commercial market” under the Enron Loophole.15 For purposes of its facilitating U.S.
WTI crude oil futures on U.S. trading terminals, the CFTC, by informal staff action, considers ICE,
because of its wholly owned subsidiary, ICE Futures Europe, to be a U.K. entity not subject to direct
CFTC regulation even though ICE maintains U.S. headquarters and U.S. trading infrastructure (i.e.,
terminals and servers), facilitating, inter alia, @ 30% of trades in U.S. WTI futures trades.16
The Dubai Mercantile Exchange, in affiliation with NYMEX, a U.S. exchange, has also been
granted permission to trade the U.S. delivered WTI contract on U.S. terminals, but is, by virtue of a
CFTC no action letter, to be regulated directly by the Dubai Financial Service Authority
(“DFSA”).17 NYMEX describes itself as “a founder and has ownership share in [DME] and
provides clearing services for that exchange.” 18
NYMEX itself, the U.S. premier regulated energy futures contract market capturing the
overwhelming share, e.g., of the U.S. delivered WTI futures market, has announced that it has
applied to the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority to have a NYMEX London trading
platform registered with the that British agency,19 after which NYMEX will apply for the kind of
foreign board of trade no action relief that has already been granted to ICE and DME. Providing
NYMEX’s London trading platform with this kind of no action relief might very well convert full
U.S. regulation of the most important U.S. crude oil futures contracts to considerable U.K.
oversight.20 These staff informal action letters, effectuating the exemptions for “foreign” owned
U.S. trading terminals, by their own terms make it clear that they may be instantly revoked by the
CFTC.21
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One final gap in the oversight of excessive speculation in the U.S. crude oil (and agricultural)
markets has been illuminated by the testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member of
Masters Capital Management, LLC, at recent May 20 and June 24 hearings before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.22 Mr. Masters demonstrated that large
financial institutions, such as investment banks and hedge funds, which were “hedging” their off
exchange futures transactions on energy and agricultural prices on U.S. regulated exchanges, were
being treated by NYMEX, for example, and the CFTC as “commercial interests,” rather than as the
speculators they clearly are.23 By lumping large financial institutions with traditional commercial oil
dealers (or farmers)24 even fully regulated U.S. exchanges are not applying traditional speculation
limits to the transactions engaged in by these speculative interests.25 Mr. Masters has demonstrated
that a significant percentage of the trades in WTI futures, for example, were controlled by noncommercial interests.26 These exemptions from speculation limits for large financial institutions
hedging off-exchange “swaps” transactions emanate from a CFTC letter issued on October 8, 199127
and they have continued to present day.28
Again, while the principal focus to date has been on skyrocketing energy prices, Mr. Masters’
testimony, aided by a widely discussed cover story in the March 31, 2008 issue of Barron’s,29 has
made clear that the categorization of swaps dealers outside of speculative controls even on U.S.
regulated contract markets has been a cause of great volatility in food prices, as well as in the energy
markets.
Many parties are now urging this Congress to close the Enron, London/Dubai, and Swaps
Dealers Loopholes. On June 18, 2008, the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 200830 (the “Farm
Bill”) was enacted into law by a Congressional override of President Bush’s veto. Title XIII of the
Farm Bill is the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, which, in turn, includes a provision that was
intended to close the Enron Loophole.31 This provision, while a good start, did not return to the
status quo prior to the passage of the Enron Loophole: i.e., it did not bring all energy futures
contracts within the U.S. futures regulatory format. Rather, the Farm Bill amendment requires the
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CFTC “at its discretion” to prove on a contract-by-contract basis through administrative proceedings
governed by the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act32 that an
individual energy contract should be regulated if the CFTC can prove that the contract “serve[s] a
significant price discovery function” in order to detect and prevent excessive speculation and
manipulation.33 The Farm Bill Amendment affords the CFTC 15 months after enactment to
implement that re-regulation process specified therein.34
The CFTC has publicly stated that it intends to apply the new legislation to only one of
ICE’s many35 unregulated ICE energy futures contract, i.e., only ICE’s Henry Hub natural gas
futures contract would be removed from the Enron Loophole protection and become fully
regulated.36 Thus, by this CFTC pronouncement, it now seems that no crude oil, gasoline, and
heating oil futures contracts will be covered by the new legislation—not even the multi-billion
agricultural/commodity index futures funds premised upon the prices of U.S. energy and
agricultural commodities about which, inter alia, Michael Masters has testified are destabilizing
the economic fundamentals of the agriculture and energy markets.
The CFTC has also made it clear that the Farm Bill amendment will not cover any U.S.
futures contracts relating to the price of U.S. delivered commodities traded on the U.S. terminals
of foreign exchanges operating pursuant to CFTC staff “no action” letters. As mentioned above,
the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) of Atlanta, Georgia, for purposes of facilitating U.S.
delivered WTI crude oil futures, is considered by the CFTC, through an informal staff no action
letter, to be a U.K. entity not subject to direct CFTC regulation even though ICE maintains U.S.
headquarters and trading infrastructure, facilitating, inter alia, @ 30% of trades in U.S. WTI
futures of its wholly owned the London subsidiary on which the no action permission is based.
Moreover, the Dubai Mercantile Exchange (“DME”), in affiliation with NYMEX, a U.S.
exchange, has also been granted permission to trade the U.S. delivered WTI contract on U.S.
terminals, but is, by virtue of a CFTC no action letter, directly regulated by the Dubai Financial
Service Authority (“DFSA”). Again, even though the plain language of the Farm Bill does not
exempt contract markets engaged in the U.S. trading of futures premised upon U.S. delivered
commodities, the CFTC will not use the Farm Bill amendment to close the “London/Dubai”
Loophole.
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Congress Should Insist Upon Full Market Transparency to Ensure That Excessive
Speculation Is Not Overwhelming Crude Oil Futures Trading
As the Committee knows, there is debate over whether the U.S. crude oil futures market
is overrun by excessive speculation. As I have said, my own view is that those independent
observers who understand those markets, by and large, concur that the markets have come
unhinged from supply/demand fundamentals in a manner that makes them no longer useable by
the physical hedgers who find prices to be “locked in” too volatile and distant from market
fundamentals.37
I would argue, however, that even if this Committee has doubts about whether excessive
speculation or more serious malpractices are occurring in these markets and thereby
unnecessarily driving up the price of crude oil, then those very doubts argue for legislation that
makes these markets fully transparent. If all of these markets (e.g., OTC, foreign board of trade
U.S. trading terminals for futures dependent on U.S. commodities, and swaps dealers) were
required to execute trades on U.S. designated contract markets or designated transaction
execution facilities, the real time and constant reporting to both the CFTC and to the market’s
own self regulatory observers, would make it indisputably clear whether the markets are
functioning solely on economic fundamentals; or whether excessive speculation is placing an
unnecessary financial burden on them and the American energy consuming public.
As it is, those who reject transparency are those who ask the U.S. energy consumer to
accept on blind faith (and I would argue in the face of substantial and reliable data pointing in the
opposite direction) that these markets are functioning smoothly.
A Prompt Return to the Time Tested Futures Regulatory Format Predating the
Enron Loophole Will Create Much Needed Crude Oil Market Transparency
Whatever form legislation takes to increase transparency in all U.S. traded energy
futures, I would urge that the following principles be embedded therein to reassure the American
energy consuming public that the price of crude oil is tied to market fundamentals rather than
excessive speculation.
Completely Close the Enron Loophole. While the Farm Bill amendment was a good
start, the radically rising price of crude oil even in the last few weeks now augurs for returning
all U.S. energy futures trading to the safe harbor of fully transparent U.S. regulated contract
markets. A simple amendment to existing law would redefine an “exempt commodity” as a
commodity that does not include an agricultural or “energy commodity,” thereby bringing all
energy futures, including energy swaps based on the price of energy commodities, within the
CEA’s regulated contract market trading requirement. An energy commodity should include
traditional energy products, inter alia, crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, propane,
electricity, and natural gas, as well as metals which have also seen a drastic run up in price. The
result of this legislation would return U.S. energy futures trading to the same status as U.S.
agricultural trading, which must be conducted on the U.S. registered contract market.
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U. S. Based Energy Futures Contracts Traded on U.S. Terminals Should Be Traded
on U.S. Regulated Exchanges. To address the concerns about the “London/Dubai” Loophole,
any futures contract premised on the price of U.S. delivered energy futures and traded on U.S.
trading terminals should be required to be traded on U. S. registered contract markets. This
requirement would not affect the overwhelming number of foreign exchanges now trading within
the U.S. who have continued to limit their trading to foreign futures contracts.
Grace Periods. Reasonable grace periods should be provided in this kind of legislation
to accommodate conversion of energy futures trading not now under U.S. oversight. A grace
period no longer than six months should accommodate this conversion.
Aggregated Speculation Limits for Non-Commercial Hedgers. Consideration should
also be given to requiring the CFTC to establish uniform speculation limits for non-commercial
futures transactions involving the U.S. trading of energy futures contracts premised upon the
price of U.S. delivered energy commodities. This would require the CFTC to “fix limits on the
aggregate number of positions which may be held by any person” for each month and in all
markets under CFTC jurisdiction. Under the existing regulatory regime, speculation limits are
only applied by each contract market, and “aggregate positions” are never imposed. These
aggregated limits would prevent a trader from spreading speculation over a host of markets,
thereby accumulating a disproportionately large share of an energy market while satisfying each
exchange’s separate limits. The aggregated limits should not be applied to “bona fide hedging
transactions” involving the trading of energy futures contracts by those having a true commercial
interest in buying or selling the underlying commodity.
Legislation meeting most or all of the above listed criteria include H.R. 6341, introduced
by Congressman Van Hollen and Congresswoman DeLauro, requiring all energy futures
contracts executed in the U.S. to be traded on U.S. regulated contract markets, thereby building
on the Farm Bill amendment’s closure of the Enron Loophole by returning all energy futures
trading, including the energy swaps market, to where it was immediately prior to that provision’s
passage, i.e., on regulated exchanges; and that legislation expressly requires the trading on U.S.
terminals of futures contracts premised upon U.S. delivered energy commodities to be similarly
subject to a U.S. regulated contract market. The latter provision would close the
“London/Dubai” Loophole.
Congressman Stupak has introduced H.R. 6330, which mirrors in function the Van
Hollen/DeLauro legislation, but, in what I refer to as a “belt and suspenders” approach,
specifically brings energy swaps transactions into the regulated futures environment; nullifies
after a grace period all foreign board of trade no action letters; imposes CTFC imposed
aggregated speculation limits on non-commercial interests for energy futures trading; requires
speculation limits to be imposed on all traders except those who are hedging commercial
interests related to the underlying commodity (thereby eliminating the hedge exemption from
speculation limits for swaps dealers); and provides strict Congressional oversight of any
exemptions provided to energy futures trading from the contract market requirements of the
legislation.
Senator Nelson of Florida, with Senator Obama as a co-sponsor, has introduced S. 3134,
which is similar to that portion of H.R. 6341 requiring all energy futures contracts to be traded

on regulated exchanges.38 Senators Cantwell and Snowe have introduced S. 3122, which mirrors
that portion of H.R. 6341 directed to closing the London/Dubai Loophole by requiring all trading
of futures based on U.S. delivered energy commodity on U.S. platforms to be governed fully and
directly by U.S. futures law.39 S. 3205, introduced by Senator Cantwell, is the Senate version of
Congressman Stupak’s H.R. 6330.
Also worthy of consideration are Senators Lieberman and Collins legislative options
designed to undercut excessive speculation in these markets through direct and aggregated
controls on non-commercial futures traders. One of their proposals would require the CFTC to
establish firm and aggregated speculation position limits on all U.S. speculative futures trading
no matter where the platform on which the trading is geographically located.40
There Are No Legal Restraints to Barring the “Foreign” Impact of Manipulation on
U.S. Markets
Arguments have been advanced that there are legal impediments to the CFTC applying
U.S. regulatory protections on Foreign Boards of Trade which bring their trading terminals to the
U.S. If that argument were correct, it would be an impediment to much of the legislation cited
above requiring the CFTC to do just that. These arguments are premised upon Section 4 (b) of
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Section 4 (b) provides in part:
No rule or regulation may be adopted by the Commission under this subsection that (1)
requires Commission approval of any contract, rule, regulation, or action of any foreign
board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade, exchange,
or market, or (2) governs in any way any rule or contract term or action of any foreign
board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade, exchange,
or market. 41
However, this clause has been construed only to mean that the CFTC does not have
jurisdiction over transactions conducted by foreign persons in a foreign country on a foreign
board of trade.42 Kleinberg v. Bear Stearns,43 dealt with a situation where London traders were
committing acts of fraud on a London exchange.44 In that case, the Court held that the CFTC did
not have enforcement jurisdiction, but explained, “It has been consistently held, at least
implicitly, that CFTC may regulate and prosecute those who practice fraud in the United States
in connection with commodities trading on foreign exchanges.”45
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To similar effect is the recent case of Mak v. Wocom Commodities,46 concerning a Hong
Kong resident placing futures trades with the defendant commodity brokers, both of which are
Hong Kong corporations (Wocom).47 The claims were denied because they were not sufficiently
particularized.48 However, the court stated that jurisdiction would have been extended if it had
been clearly shown that there was “particularized harm to our domestic markets.”49 With ICE
we currently have trading by U.S. customers in U.S. denominated currency on U.S. terminals in
the foremost benchmark U.S. crude oil futures contracts with substantial evidence demonstrating
“particularized harm to our domestic markets.”
Indeed these cases are consistent with a fundamental tenet of federal financial
enforcement jurisprudence that federal financial regulatory jurisdiction extends even to wholly
foreign transactions when domestic financial markets suffer “from the effects of [an] improper
foreign transaction[.]”50 The leading commentators on U.S. derivatives regulation have,
accordingly stated: “[E]ven without substantial activity in the United States, jurisdiction will
exist when conduct abroad has a substantial affect upon U.S. markets and U.S. investors.”51
Confirmation of this broad sweep of U.S. jurisdiction to address overseas malpractices
significantly impacting U.S. markets is evidenced most clearly by the Sumitomo case.52 In that
case, the CFTC’s enforcement division reached a settlement agreement with a Japanese
corporation upon determining that the Japanese head copper trader of the Sumitomo Corporation
manipulated the price of U.S. copper almost exclusively through trading done in London on the
London Metals Exchange.53 The CFTC imposed $150 million in fines and restitution.54 Only a
small portion of the trading was done in the U.S. and the London Metals Exchange contact with
the U.S. was limited to a U.S. warehouse.55 Despite these limited U.S. contacts, “the penalty
[assessed was then] the largest ever levied by a U.S. Government agency,” and it was widely
recognized that the settlement indicated that “manipulation of any commodity traded in the
[U.S.] could be the subject of a C.F.T.C. action, even if no acts were committed in this
country.”56
Clearly, then, trading done on trading platforms within the U.S. would be subject to full
CFTC regulatory authority. The fact that ICE is headquartered in Atlanta with its trade matching
engines in Chicago and it controls through its U.S. terminals over 30% of the lead U.S.-delivered
petroleum contract only makes the jurisdictional question that much easier. The same is true of
the Dubai exchange that partners with U.S.-based NYMEX to trade WTI contracts on U.S.
terminals; and of the prospect of NYMEX opening a London trading platform for its energy
46
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futures products, but escaping U.S. regulation for that trading through a staff no action letter
treating NYMEX as if it were a U.K. entity.
Even more important, Sumitomo and its progeny are an answer to those many threats
levied by large U.S. financial institutions that assert, if their trading on “foreign” trading
terminals located in the U.S. is regulated, they will simply move that trading abroad. To be
clear, any trading done in the U.S. on foreign exchanges is a fortiori covered by the applicable
U.S. commodity laws.57 So when the threat is made that the U.S. institutions will trade abroad, it
means that it will be done completely outside of the sovereign U.S. However, the Sumitomo line
of cases make clear that the CFTC, and for that matter, United States Department of Justice for
purposes of related criminal prosecution,58 can enforce violations of U.S. laws abroad if U.S.
markets are significantly impacted by the wrongdoing in foreign countries. In short, speculators
cannot escape the reach of U.S. civil and criminal law if they cause price distortions in U.S.
commodity markets.
Moreover, as I have testified elsewhere, no exchange, wherever located, can develop
liquidity in and maximize profits from trading U.S. delivered futures products without having a
substantial U.S. presence.59 This is evidenced by the 18 CFTC staff no action letters issued to
foreign exchanges from all over the world allowing the placement of trading terminals in the
U.S. 60 In short, the threat that trading in U.S. delivered commodities will be done exclusively
abroad is idle when confronted by both economic and legal realities.
The Intercontinental Exchange Cannot Fairly Be Deemed British for Purposes of
Trading U.S. Petroleum Futures in U.S. Dollars on U.S. Trading Terminals with U.S.
Trading Engines
Of course, all of the above jurisdictional analysis assumes that ICE (and DME) are
“foreign” boards of trade. While ICE has a London wholly owned subsidiary, that office is
controlled by ICE’s headquarters in Atlanta; ICE’s trading engines are in Chicago; it is trading
over 30% of the U.S. premier crude oil futures contract in U.S. denominated currency. ICE’s
non-petroleum products, i.e., natural gas futures contracts, are clearly traded within U.S.
jurisdiction and are subject to re-regulation under U.S. law by virtue of the Farm Bill’s “End the
Enron Loophole” provision.61 ICE also owns a fully regulated U.S. exchange: formerly the New
York Board of Trade (NYBOT); now ICE Futures U.S. It defies all logic that such an exchange
57
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can be called “foreign” based on the name given to its wholly owned subsidiary (ICE Futures
Europe) and maintaining a London office that could as easily be operated out within the U.S.
The same is also true of the Dubai Mercantile Exchange. Its principal partner is the New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), a U.S. regulated exchange and a U.S. entity. The
President of NYMEX sits on DME’s board. DME has authority to trade the U.S. delivered WTI
contract on trading terminals in the U.S. Under these circumstances, DME is clearly a U.S.
exchange
The illogic of the FBOT staff no action process is highlighted by NYMEX, a U.S.
regulated exchange headquartered in the U.S., establishing a London futures trading platform
under the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime and then applying for an FBOT staff no action
letter to allow trading within the U.S. on its NYMEX London platform. NYMEX will then have
converted itself from a U.S. entity into a British entity for purposes of U.S. trades on the
platform with the principal regulation of those trades in the hands of the United Kingdom.
And, why should NYMEX not do this? It is following precisely the ICE template.
However, the proposal defies all good sense, and, even worse, it will add darkness to the trading
markets that affect the price of crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil within the U.S.
Under the ICE, DME and London/NYMEX scenarios, each of these exchanges are
clearly U.S. exchanges and their trading terminals should be regulated as U.S. regulated contract
markets. Moreover, as U.S. contract markets, they and the traders on those exchanges (no matter
whether they trade in the U.S. or abroad) are fully subject to both CFTC civil jurisdiction and
United States federal criminal statutes.62 For example, in Tamari v. Bache63 the Seventh Circuit
held there was federal jurisdiction to enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, even though the
trader and the trader’s broker accused of fraud were both situated in Lebanon,64 by stating: “that
Congress intended to proscribe fraudulent conduct associated with any commodity future
transactions executed on a domestic exchange, regardless of the location of the agents that
facilitate the trading” and thus there was jurisdiction.65
The CFTC Has Consistently Viewed Foreign Exchanges Trading on U.S. Terminals
Subject to Full U.S. Regulation
It has been shown immediately above, that as a legal matter there is no bar either within
the CEA as now drafted nor within the case law that prevents the CFTC from gaining full
regulatory control, over any futures trading done in the U.S Even if one were to assume that ICE,
for example, is truly a foreign board of trade, Section 4 (b) only bars regulation of trading done
by foreign citizens in foreign countries trading foreign commodities on foreign exchanges when
such trading does not cause substantial dysfunctions to U.S. markets. Below it is shown that this
well established law has governed the CFTC’s FBOT staff no action process since its inception.
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The staff no action process initiated in 1999 was not developed under a view that,
pursuant to Section 4 (b), the CFTC could not regulate foreign exchanges who wished to put
trading terminals in the U.S. To the contrary, the history is clear that those foreign exchanges
themselves recognized that, in the absence of an exemption under Section 4 (c) of the CEA,66
they would have to fully register as a U.S. contract market. As their plain language made clear
when they were first issued in 1999, the FBOT no action letters originated from a rulemaking
proceeding that, by its very terms, indicated that permission to put terminals in the U.S. derived
from Section 4 (c)’s exemption from full regulation and not from Section 4 (b)’s absolute bar
against foreign regulation.67 It must be remembered that Section 4 (b) does not countenance
exceptions to its general restriction. The no action letters include a myriad of regulatory
conditions on the foreign boards of trade that are completely inconsistent with the absolute bar
within Section 4 (b).68
If there were any doubt about the above analysis, it was belied by the actions of the
CFTC on June 17, 2008 and July 8, 2008, when it added four new conditions to the existing ICE
Futures Europe and Dubai Mercantile Exchange no action letters.69 While these additional
conditions have only been applied to ICE and DME, Acting Chairman Lukken’s related
comments show that the CFTC has the authority to incorporate them in the now outstanding 14
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other FBOT staff no action letters affecting every foreign board of trade with U.S. terminals, as
well as any FBOT that seeks an exemption from U.S. direct regulation in the future.70
If Section 4 (b)’s absolute prohibition were applicable to FBOTs with U.S. terminals, as
some have argued as a predicate to limiting legislative or administrative action in this area, how
could the CFTC add these new conditions to the outstanding no action letters? Those new
conditions, inter alia, require large trader reporting and the imposition of speculation limits.71
The failure of the FBOTs to comply could result in the revocation of the no action letters,
thereby requiring each FBOT to register as a fully regulated U.S. contract market.72
Those who would attempt to limit Congressional and regulatory controls on ICE, DME,
and NYMEX/London have also relied upon a November 2006 policy statement issued by the
CFTC on the FBOT no action letter process.73 Much is made about the fact that Section 4 (b) is
cited and quoted therein. Whatever the purpose of that 4 (b) reference, the assertion that 4 (b)
presents an absolute bar is belied by the following within that policy statement:
[i]n the absence of no-action relief, a board of trade, exchange or market that permits
direct access by U.S. persons might be subject to Commission action for violation of,
among other provisions, section 4(a) of the CEA, if it were not found to qualify for the
exclusion from the DCM designation or DTEF registration requirement.74
In short, the failure to gain no action relief would mean that, in the absence of registration as a
fully regulated contract market, the FBOT would have to remove its U.S. terminals according to
the CFTC’s own analysis. As the CFTC expressly stated in its June17, 2008 letter to ICE
imposing the new conditions on its no action status, if ICE satisfies the four new conditions, the
CFTC “will not recommend that the Commission institute enforcement action against [ICE]
based upon [ICE’s] failure to seek contract market designation or registration as a DTEF under
Sections 5 and 5a of the Act.”
Again, the action of the CFTC adding further conditions to the ICE no action letter,
including large trader reporting and speculation limits, upon pain of an enforcement proceeding
based on the failure to register as a U.S. regulated contract market, clearly demonstrates that the
CFTC meant what it said in the above quoted reference from its 2006 policy statement, it has
70
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broad powers to require a “foreign” exchange to fully register in the U.S. or terminate its
presence in this country.75 Section 4 (b) provides no impediment to those powers.
Efforts Designed to Oversee and Improve the Foreign Regulation of U.S. Delivered Futures
on U.S. Terminals May Not Effectively Close the “London/Dubai” Loophole
Congressman Etheridge of this Committee76 and Senators Durbin and Levin in the Senate
have introduced legislation which ratchets up the existing CFTC oversight of foreign boards of
trade energy futures trading on U.S. trading terminals (“FBOTs”). That legislation, while a
major improvement over the present regulatory environment, still leaves primary and direct
enforcement and oversight in the hands of the foreign regulator, e.g., the U.K.’s Financial
Services Authority in the case of ICE; or the Dubai Financial Services Authority in the case of
the DME.
It is my understanding the this legislation deferring to the primacy of foreign regulators to
oversee U.S. terminals operated by FBOTs derives from a concern that section 4 (b) of the Act
bars U.S. regulation of even those FBOTs in the U.S.77 As has been shown above,78 section 4
(b), whatever it means, is an absolute bar to any U.S. regulation,79 whereas H. 6334 does ratchet
up U.S. regulation of the foreign exchange. Moreover, as shown above,80 section 4 (b)’s bar
only applies to foreign trades on foreign exchanges of foreign commodities not having a
significant impact on U.S. markets. Therefore, policy concerns about section 4 (b) should not
govern the regulation of FBOT terminals in the U.S., especially when those terminals trade U.S.
delivered futures contracts; and even more so when the FBOTs institutional ties are so closely
affiliated with the U.S. and U.S. institutions that the FBOT loses all claim to foreign status.
Again, legislation such as that proposed by Congressman Etheridge, is a major
improvement of what had been the CFTC’s oversight of FBOTs’ U.S. terminals.
This kind of legislation affords the CFTC the authority to enforce the prohibitions of
section 9 of the Act, concerning criminal penalties, including anti-manipulation prohibitions
therein, and “to limit, reduce, or liquidate any position” on the FBOT in aid of preventing, inter
alia, manipulation and excessive speculation enforcement.81 Imposition of restrictions on the
FBOT, however, must be preceded by consultation with the FBOTs foreign regulator.82
The CFTC “may apply such recordkeeping requirements [to the FBOT] as the
Commission determines are necessary,”83 and before the CFTC exempts an FBOT from full U.S.
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contract market regulatory requirements, it must ensure that the FBOT operating the U.S.
terminals “appl[y] comparable principles” to those of the CFTC for “daily publication of trading
information and position limits or accountability levels for speculators” and provides to the
CFTC “the information that the [CFTC] determines necessary to publish a Commitment of
Traders report” for U.S regulated contract markets.84
Legislation of the kind introduced by Congressman Etheridge also requires the CFTC to
conduct a review of FBOT no action status for existing FBOTs between the first anniversary of
the passage of S. 3130 and one and one half years thereafter to ensure FBOT compliance with
the new statutory requirements imposed by this legislation.85
In any event, recent actions taken by the CFTC to increase regulation of ICE and DME
may place the requirements of Congressman Etheridge’s bill in a new context.
CFTC’s New Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Boards of Trade with U.S. Terminals
For at least two years prior to May 20, 2008, the CFTC had repeatedly assured Congress
and market participants that the dramatic rise in crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, and heating oil
was caused exclusively by supply/demand market fundamentals.86 The CFTC had based its
conclusions on its “exhaustive” research of all relevant market data.87
Indeed, as recently as May 20, 2008, before the full Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee, the CFTC’s Mr. Harris, testified: “[A]ll the data modeling and
analysis we have done to date indicates there is little economic evidence to demonstrate that
prices are being systematically driven by speculators in these [agriculture and energy] markets....
84
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[O]ur comprehensive analysis of the actual position data of these traders fails to support [the]
contention” that there is excessive speculation or manipulation.88 Rather, he said “prices are
being driven by powerful economic fundamental forces and the laws of supply demand.”89
In a rather dramatic about face, the CFTC suddenly announced on May 29, 2008 (or just
nine days after Mr. Harris testimony) that that agency is in the midst of an investigation into the
crude oil energy markets90 and it will now begin to collect substantial amounts of new data to
determine what is undergirding high oil prices.91 This reversal in course is almost certainly the
product of intense pressure placed on the CFTC by Congress to ensure that excessive speculative
activity is not being conducted on the principal market over which the CFTC has declined
primary responsibility, i.e., trading done on ICE and on ICE’s U.S. terminals.92
As crude oil and gas prices continued to spike even after the CFTC’s May 29, 2008,
announcement, the pressure on the CFTC did not let up. Thus, by June 17, 2008, the CFTC once
again increased its pressure on ICE.
In a dramatic June 17, 2008 letter to ICE, the CFTC Director of Market Oversight
referenced the fact that ICE had moved its trading platform from London “to the ICE Platform
operated by [ICE] in Atlanta, Georgia,” and that that U.S. platform was now trading three U.S.
delivered energy futures products (WTI, heating oil, and gasoline) “each of which is cash-settled
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on the price of physically-settled contracts traded on NYMEX.”93 Most importantly, the June 17
letter to ICE then stated:
A foreign board of trade listing for trading a contract which settles on the price of a
contract traded on a CFTC-regulated exchange raises very serious concerns for the
Commission. . . . In the absence of preventive measures at [ICE], this circumstance could
compromise the [CFTC’s] ability to carry out its market surveillance responsibilities, as
well as the integrity of prices established on CFTC-regulated exchanges. . .[T]he division
retains the authority to condition further, modify, suspend, terminate, or otherwise restrict
the terms of the no-action relief provided herein, in its discretion.94
In order to address the CFTC’s “very serious concerns” that it had “compromise[d] [its
own] ability to carry out its market surveillance responsibilities, as well as the integrity of the
prices established” thereon, the letter then outlined four new conditions that it imposed upon
ICE: “position limits or position accountability levels (including related hedge exemption
provisions) as adopted by” U.S. regulated contract markets; quarterly reports of any member
exceeding those levels and limits; publication of daily trading information comparable to that
required of U.S. contract markets; daily reporting of “large trader positions” as provided by U.S.
regulated markets.95
ICE was given 120 days to come into compliance with the new CFTC conditions.96 The
CFTC acknowledged that the new ICE rules would have to be approved by the FSA.97 The June
17 letter to ICE concludes by stating that only if ICE complies with the conditions outlined
therein can ICE be assured that the CFTC will “not recommend that the Commission institute
enforcement action against [ICE] or its members” based on ICE’s failure to register as a U.S.
regulated contract market.98
On June 17, 2008, the day that that letter to ICE was released, CFTC Acting Chairman
Lukken is reported to have told the Senate oversight committee: "The CFTC will also require
other foreign exchanges that seek such direct access to provide the CFTC with comparable large
trader reports and to impose comparable position and accountability limits for any products
linked with US regulated futures contracts[.]" 99 On July 7, 2008, an identical CFTC staff letter
was written to the DME.
It would seem that much of what the CFTC has done implements the data collection
requirements included in Congressman Etheridge’s bill. Indeed, the CFTC’s threat of
enforcement authority against ICE in its June 17, 2008 letter, while limited for these purposes to
failing to register as a U.S. regulated contract market, would seem to make it clear that that
agency could enforce all civil and criminal penalties asserted throughout the CEA against ICE
93
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and its members if appropriate, thereby possibly even exceeding the grant of section 9
enforcement powers afforded the CFTC with regard to FBOTs in S. 3130.
As will be shown below, however, the present skyrocketing cost of crude oil and its
derivative products, as well as the resulting destabilization of the U.S. economy, would seem to
counsel the use of the full force of the CFTC’s powers to bring ICE and similar “foreign”
exchanges with trading terminals in the U.S. trading futures premised on U.S. delivered energy
commodities under complete, direct, and real time U.S. regulatory control.
Deference to Foreign Regulators over U.S. Energy Futures Trading Deprives U.S.
Energy Markets and U.S. Energy Consumers of the Full Weight of CEA Protections
The question arises whether the U.S. should continue to regulate FBOT trading of U.S.
energy futures on U.S. terminals principally through foreign regulators while requiring more
aggressive CFTC oversight of that process. Or, should trading of U.S. delivered energy products
on U.S. terminals be deemed a sufficient nexus to the U.S. and the well being of its economy to
require direct U.S. supervision. If Congress settles for the status quo as evidenced by the
CFTC’s most recent actions if forsakes a wealth of traditional regulatory tools that the CFTC has
to ensure that U.S. energy markets and prices are rooted in economic fundamentals.
The Lack of Emergency Authority to Intervene in Market Distortions. The
most substantial risk in following the CFTC policy of leaving ICE and other similarly situated
“foreign” exchanges under the principal supervision of foreign regulators while those exchanges
have U.S. terminals trading critically important U.S. delivered energy products is that the CFTC
cannot exercise its broad emergency authority to intervene immediately when confronted with
emergencies and dysfunctions on U.S. regulated contract markets.100
Described as the CEA’s “most potent tool,” section 8a (9) provides that “whenever [the
CFTC] has reason to believe that an emergency exists,” it may take such actions “including, but
not limited to “the setting of temporary emergency margin levels on any futures contract [and]
the fixing of limits that may apply to a market position.”101 An “emergency” is defined:
“to mean, in addition to threatened or actual market manipulations and corners,
any act the United states or a foreign government affecting a commodity or any
other major market disturbance which prevents the market from accurately
reflecting the forces of supply demand for such commodity.”102
It should be born in mind that these emergency powers afford the CFTC the immediate right to
alter on a real time basis margin requirements and speculation and position limits to deal with
crises as they arise “which prevent[] the market from accurately reflecting the forces of supply
demand[.]” While section 8a (9) affords direct judicial review of orders after they are issued in a
federal court of appeals, it does not by its terms require emergency orders to be preceded by
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notice and an opportunity to be heard, thereby ensuring speedy restoration of normal market
processes.103
When one reads this broad power afforded to the CFTC, one could reasonably ask why it
has not been used on days such as Friday, June 6, 2008 when the WTI crude oil futures prices
rose nearly $11 per barrel in a single day.104 That is best explained by the fact that the only real
time market data in the hands of the CFTC on that day was from NYMEX—the fully regulated
U.S. exchange with speculation limits in place; perhaps if the CFTC had meaningful and real
time ICE data on that day, thereby seeing the entirety of the WTI crude oil market, it might have
seen a need to intervene under its emergency authority to impose temporary position limits and
margin requirements to cool down what was widely viewed as breathtaking volatility.
Of course, even when it receives the ICE data within 120 days of its June 17, 2008
requirements, the CFTC will still not have the authority under the governing CFTC no action
letter to use its emergency intervention powers on ICE even though over 60% of ICE U.S.
delivered WTI futures trading is done within our own country. Rather than exercising real time
emergency authority, the CFTC will have to once again “negotiate” with the FSA to have that
U.K. regulator intervene to deal with, inter alia, ICE WTI trade matching systems located in
Chicago, Illinois.
Moreover, relying upon the FSA to intervene on a real time basis for a “major market
disturbance” on a U.S. delivered energy futures contract traded on U.S. terminals is as
problematic as a matter of policy as it is as a matter of logistics. Unlike the robust emergency
authority given by Congress to the CFTC under section 8a (9), the FSA emergency powers have
been implemented in a quite lackluster fashion. While its governing statute affords intervention
power105, FSA makes clear on its web site that the U.K. has translated any such authority when
“major operational disruptions” are detected on ICE, to a “Tripartite Standing Committee” that
would convene the “Cross Market Business Continuity Group” (CMBCG) to:
“provide[] a forum for establishing senior-level practitioner views . . . . Its role
is advisory: decisions will be for the relevant official or market authorities or
for firms themselves either individually or collectively through the agency of
the CMBCG. The CMBCG may also have a role in pooling information to help
facilitate private sector decisions and workarounds to alleviate pressures on the
system.”106
This U.K. guidance for sharing “views” and for “pooling information” in an “advisory”
capacity to “help facilitate private sector” decisions in London is what the U.S. industrial
consumers of crude oil and the U.S. gas consuming public are left to fall back upon when WTI
crude oil soon skyrockets to $150 per barrel as has been predicted by Morgan Stanley, one of the
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founders of ICE.107 The CFTC’s June 17 imposition of new conditions on ICE do not convert
the U.K.’s lackluster emergency responses into the vigorous emergency responses called for by
U.S. law.
Indeed, any effort by Congress to insist upon “comparability” on emergency powers is
futile. As the Financial Times has so aptly commented on June 20, 2008, the U.K.’s futures
regulator “operates a . . . system of ‘credible deterrence’ of wrongdoing by engaging in a
dialogue with market participants. Since the FSA’s creation in 1997, it has brought no civil or
criminal cases in energy markets.”108 In stark contrast, as Acting Chairman Lukken recently
proudly reported to Congress: “[s]ince December 2002 to the present time, the [CFTC] has filed
a total of 39 enforcement actions charging a total of 64 defendants with violations involving the
energy markets,” having referred “35 criminal actions concerning energy market misconduct” to
the Department of Justice.109
The contrast between FSA and CFTC enforcement activity in the energy futures markets
under their control is quite remarkable, especially since ICE is responsible for nearly 50% of all
crude oil futures contracts traded worldwide and since the CFTC has not had access to
meaningful ICE data.110
The American gas consuming public’s trust in the FSA might also be shaken by the
U.K.’s response to the June 17, 2008 CFTC announcement of the imposition of new
transparency requirements on ICE’s use of U.S. terminals used as a critical part of ICE’s control
of over 30 % of the U.S. delivered WTI contract. Mr. Stuart Fraser, head of policy at the City of
London Corporation, is reported in the Financial Times to have called the CFTC June 17 letter
“American imperialism,” and adding for measure “if a bunch of [S]enators want to get rude
about the FSA, that’s fine, but don’t interfere in our market.”111
Of course, the UK is wrong to think trading on U.S. terminals of the U.S. WTI contract is
“their” market. ICE is U.S. owned, operated in Atlanta with trading terminals and engines in the
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U.S. and trading over 30% of U.S. delivered crude oil futures market in U.S. dollar denominated
currency.
However, one could easily see how those officials in the U.K. might mistakenly view
WTI trading on U.S. terminals as “their” market when the CFTC and ICE continue to refer to
this self evidently “U.S.” market as being conducted on a “foreign” exchange. If the CFTC were
to flatly state the obvious ( i.e., ICE Futures Europe is wholly owned by a U.S. concern, having
brought the corpus of the old British International Petroleum Exchange, for all intents and
purposes, to the U.S.). the UK might grasp the reality of the situation, rather than the ICE
perpetuated “London” myth.
Deferring to Foreign Regulators Undercuts the Self Regulatory and Surveillance
Requirements of U.S. Law.
Next to the inability to exercise the extraordinary emergency powers afforded the CFTC
to oversee its markets by deferring to the foreign regulators to supervise U.S. energy futures
products on U.S. trading terminals, the most serious problem with further CFTC or
Congressional deference to FSA is the foregoing of the substantial self regulation and
surveillance provided by U.S. regulated contract markets to assist U.S. regulators in policing
futures markets.
The “core principles” within the CEA that must be followed by an approved U.S.
regulated contract market emphasize the importance having those markets serve as the first line
of defense for the CFTC in detecting fraud, manipulation, excessive speculation, and other
unlawful trading malpractices.112 Without aggressive self-policing of the entirety of the
regulated U.S. futures markets, the CFTC simply cannot do its job.
The seriousness with which U.S. regulated markets take their statutorily mandated selfpolicing and surveillance role is evidenced by NYMEX’s “standards and safeguards” concerning
trade and market surveillance. For example, NYMEX makes clear:
Market surveillance is required under CFTC regulations. Each day, the compliance staff
compiles a profile of participants, identifying members and their customers holding
reportable positions. In addition, daily surveillance is performed to ensure that Exchange
prices reflect cash market price movements, that the futures market converges with the
cash market at contract expiration, and that there are no price distortions and no market
manipulation. . . .113
As to trade surveillance, NYMEX provides:
Compliance department analysts are trained to spot instances of misconduct, including
“front running” or trading ahead of a customer; wash or accommodation trading
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(transactions creating the appearance of trading activity, but which have no real economic
effect); prohibited cross trading (trading directly or indirectly with a customer except
under very limited circumstances, or matching two customer orders without offering
them competitively); prearranged trading; and non-competitive trading.114
NYMEX reports that is has @ $6.5 million budget for oversight market surveillance with
an enforcement staff of @ 40 personnel.
No detailed analysis of ICE’s self-regulatory and surveillance system is required. Suffice
it to say, that for all of ICE’s worldwide markets which are accessible by the U.S. trading
terminals, including the U.S. WTI contract, reports are that ICE employs no more than ten
individuals on its surveillance staff, i.e., a staff that is one quarter the size of NYMEX. This staff
monitors trading of a host of ICE contracts, including those contracts which control over 47% of
the world crude oil futures.115 Of course, for those energy futures trades ICE executes under the
Enron Loophole (because those trades do not derive from the old-IPE), such as the critical Henry
Hub U.S. delivered natural gas futures contract, ICE, as of now, has no self-regulation or
surveillance system.
Moreover, leaving ICE’s paltry surveillance resources to the side, the principal regulator
to which the CFTC is deferring to oversee directly over 30% of U.S. delivered WTI contracts,
the U.K.’s FSA, has only “two full time supervisors,” monitoring all of the ICE contracts under
their jurisdiction.116 Again, this includes 47% of world’s energy futures contracts.
In sum, even though the CFTC has ratcheted up ICE’s regulatory obligations by adding
large trader reporting and speculation limits to the WTI trading, it defers to the FSA for the
remainder of the oversight of ICE. In effect, this deference to the U.K. for U.S. trading of the
critically important WTI contracts surrenders emergency authority to intervene when there are
market dysfunctions to impose temporary margin requirements and position limits; and it
sacrifices the real “eyes and ears” policing these markets (i.e., the regulated exchanges
themselves) by depending upon ICE’s meager surveillance systems.
In a time of economic distress for American industry and the American consumer caused
by skyrocketing energy prices, this country cannot afford to outsource authority to the UK to
oversee trading on 30% of our own U.S. delivered crude oil futures contracts, much of which is
consummated on U.S. based trading terminals and all of which is trade matched in Chicago,
Illinois.
Finally, it bears repeating that during last summer’s subprime mortgage crisis, Northern
Rock PLC, one of the U.K.’s largest banks, was required to borrow billions of dollars from the
U.K.’s central bank.117 After news of the bailout was released to the public, thousands of
customers wary of losing their savings stood in long lines for several days outside of Northern
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Rock’s branches to withdraw deposits.118 With Northern Rock on the brink of collapse, the FSA
provided over $100 billion in loans to the bank and in February 2008, the British government
finally was required to nationalize it.119 In March 2008, FSA published an internal report stating
that its regulation of Northern Rock "was not carried out to a standard that is acceptable," and
highlighted its own failure to provide adequate supervision, oversight, and resources.120 In
addition to FSA’s self-criticism, in April 2008, the European Union opened a formal
investigation into FSA’s restructuring of Northern Rock.121
This episode, maybe more than any other, reveals that Congress cannot afford to leave
direct oversight of trading on U.S. terminals of the most important futures contract in
determining the price of oil, gasoline, and heating oil. As demonstrated above,122 Congress has
the full authority to pass legislation placing those U.S. terminals under U.S. regulatory control.
Threats that the U.S. reassertion of regulatory control over trading within the U.S. will
drive trading overseas are undercut by the reality of every major futures foreign exchange having
set up shop in the U.S.; and by the well documented law described above that even a foreign
trader in a foreign country who illegally disrupts U.S. markets is subject to the full force and
effect of that law.
Finally, contrary to the assertion of the City of London Corporation, this is not a
“British” market; it is a U.S. market principally being traded in the U.S. by a trading entity
controlled by a U.S. corporation. The economic distress now being suffered by Americans over
high energy products cannot be placed in the hands of foreign governments when those products
are traded here and have such a huge impact on our economy.
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